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Abstract
Analysis of a group of automorphisms of a free group as a platform for
conjugacy-based group cryptography
by
Pavel Shostak

Adviser: Professor Alexei Miasnikov

Let F be a finitely generated free group and Aut(F ) its group of automorphisms. In this
monograph we discuss potential uses of Aut(F ) in group-based cryptography. Our main focus
is on using Aut(F ) as a platform group for the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol, Ko-Lee
protocol, and other protocols based on different versions of the conjugacy search problem or
decomposition problem, such as Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol. We attack the Anshel-AnshelGoldfeld and Ko-Lee protocols by adapting the existing types of the length-based attack to
the specifics of Aut(F )1 . We also present our own version of the length-based attack that
significantly increases the attack’ success rate. After discussing the attacks, we discuss the
ways to make keys from Aut(F ) resistant to different versions of the length-based attacks
including our own.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol [Anshel et al., 1999] (subsequently called the AAG
protocol) is one of the major protocols in group-based cryptography. The security of the
AAG protocol was extensively analyzed for braid groups [Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2006b]
[Hofheinz and Steinwandt, 2003]

[Garber et al., 2006]

[Miasnikov et al., 2005]

[Miasnikov et al., 2006] [Myasnikov and Ushakov, 2007]. The AAG protocol used on the
platform of braid groups was successfully attacked [Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2006b] using the
length-based attack (subsequently called the LBA attack). However, the security of the
AAG protocol was not sufficiently analyzed for different platform groups. Here we analyze
the AAG protocol on the platform of Aut(F ), the group of automorphisms on a free group
F . We want to evaluate the efficiency of the LBA attack in case of the Aut(F ) platform
group.
Furthermore, the AAG protocol is based on the subgroup-restricted simultaneous conjugacy search problem. It means that if we show that the LBA attack is efficient for the AAG
protocol, it also would be efficient against other protocols that rely on the conjugacy search
problem including the Ko-Lee protocol and to an extent the Ushakov-Shpilrain protocol.
Also, we want to analyze the weaknesses and limitations of the LBA attack itself. It
1
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might allow us to generate LBA-resistant keys.

2

Chapter 2
History of classic public-key
cryptography
The main purpose of computers is dealing with data so the need for efficient data encryption
for safe data storage was there from the beginning of computers. However, the invention
of networks and their subsequent rapid proliferation promoted efficient cryptography to one
of the top priorities. The cryptography itself is nothing new but due to the specifics of
networks all classic cryptography algorithms are inapplicable. All classic algorithms for
encrypting and decrypting data imply that communicating parties privately agree a secret
encryption/decryption key. It is crucial that key agreement is private and not observed by
any third-party. By classic algorithms we mean algorithms developed in pre-networking era,
all kinds of substitution and transposition ciphers that were known from ancient times.
Such private key agreement is impossible in networks where all communications are a
potential target for eavesdropping. In open sources, the first solution appeared in 1976 when
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published their paper [Diffie and Hellman, 1976] on
public-key cryptography suggesting there a procedure that is known now as Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol. Martin Hellman himself however suggested [Hellman, 2002] that the
3
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protocol should be called ”Diffie-Hellman-Merkle” since it uses a public key distribution
system, a concept developed by Merkle.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is based on the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem in the finite cyclic groups, that is recovering a from g and g a . As it stands
now, this problem does not have efficient solution for a good [Menezes et al., 1996] choice
of parameters. In general, if function f is easy to compute but its f −1 is hard to compute
then such f is called one-way trapdoor function or just trapdoor function. One-way trapdoor
functions make the foundation of all public-key cryptography algorithms.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol allows two communicating parties traditionally
referred as Alice and Bob to establish a shared secret key in the presence of the eavesdropper
traditionally referred as Eve. All communications between Alice and Bob are known to
Eve; Eve knows the rules of the key exchange protocol as well but still Eve is not able
to compute the shared secret key of Alice and Bob. Such key exchange protocol made
encryption/decryption possible in networks where all communications are a potential target
for eavesdropping.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
1. Alice and Bob choose a finite cyclic group G with a generating element g.
2. Alice picks a random natural number a and publishes g a . a itself remains an Alice’s
secret key.
3. Bob picks a random natural number b and publishes g b . b itself remains a Bob’s secret
key.
4. Alice computes KA = (g b )a = g ba
5. Bob computes KB = (g a )b = g ab
Since ab = ba, KA = KB . Thus, Alice and Bob posses the same shared secret key.
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Later, in 1985, ElGamal suggested a cryptosystem [ElGamal, 1985] based on DiffieHellman key exchange protocol.
ElGamal cryptosystem
1. Alice and Bob choose a finite cyclic group G with a generating element g.
2. Alice picks a random natural number a and publishes g a . a itself remains an Alice’s
secret key.
3. To send a message m ∈ G, Bob picks a random natural number b and sends m0 =
m · (g a )b and g b to Alice.
4. Alice recovers m = m0 · ((g b )a )−1
ElGamal encryption has a beneficial property of being probabilistic meaning that a single
plaintext can be encrypted in many different cyphertexts. However, ElGamal is computationally intensive for Alice and Bob for the realistic parameters and the size of cyphertext is
twice as large as plaintext. As a result, usually ElGamal is used not to encrypt the message
itself but to establish symmetric shared secret key between Alice and Bob.
The original ElGamal cryptosystem later was found to be vulnerable to the chosen cyphertext attack. Later, the advanced versions of ElGamal cryptosystem were developed to fix
that problem. One such cryptosystem based on ElGamal is Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem
[Cramer and Shoup, 1998] suggested in 1998. The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is proven to
be resistant to adaptive chosen cyphertext attack.
In 1978 Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman suggested [R. Rivest, 1978] a
cryptosystem that become known as RSA. Since then, RSA has become one of the major
ways to establish private communications in the Internet.
RSA cryptosystem
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1. Alice’s private key is a pair p, q of large prime numbers.
2. Alice’s public key consists of the product n = pq, an integer e such that 1 < e < ϕ(n),
where ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler function of n and e and ϕ(n) are relatively
prime.
3. Bob encrypts the message m which is an integer number 0 < m < n by computing
c ≡ me (mod n) and sends c to Alice.
4. In order to decrypt c, Alice finds an integer d such that de ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)) and
computes cd ≡ (me )d ≡ med (mod n) Since ed ≡ 1 + kϕ(n),

med ≡ m1+kϕ(n) ≡ m(mk )ϕ(n) ≡ m (mod n)

The security of RSA is based on the hardness of factorization problem. If one finds an efficient method to find p and q from n = pq the RSA encryption will be broken. For example,
the Pollards ”p-1 algorithm” [Pollard, 1974] allows efficient factorization for certain specific
cases which obviously should be avoided when choosing Alice’s private key. Another promising approach is the Shor’s factorization algorithm. But the Shor’s algorithm is quantum and
requires quantum computer to run.
Another classic public-key cryptography algorithm is Rabin’s cryptosystem. It was the
first algorithm where it was proven that recovering plaintext from the cyphertext is as hard
as factoring.
Rabin’s cryptosystem
1. Alice chooses the pair of large primes p, q, where p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4) and shares a
public key n = pq.
2. Bob encrypts the message m which is an integer number 0 < m < n by computing
c ≡ m2 (mod n) and sends c to Alice.
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3. Alice computes the following values

mp = c(p+1)/4 modp
and

mq = c(q+1)/4 modq
Then she computes

±r = (yp · p · mq + yq · q · mp ) mod n
and
±s = (yp · p · mq − yq · q · mp ) mod n
where yp · p + yq · q = 1. ±r and ±s are square roots of c modulo p and modulo q, and
therefore also modulo n.
All of the above classic public-key cryptography algorithms function on the groups of
integers. The security of these algorithms is based on the complexity of different problems
like factorization and the discrete logarithm problem for the groups of integers. However,
there exist a number of quantum algorithms efficiently solving these problems and therefore breaking the cryptosystems based on them. As of now, quantum computers needed
to run such algorithms barely exist, but the recent advances in that field [Knight, 2017]
[Hsu, 2018] [Kelly, 2018] indicate the need for new cryptosystems resistant to quantum algorithms attacks. In fact, such a need was instantly obvious since at least 1997 when Peter
Shor published [Shor, 1997] his quantum algorithm for integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem. Another prominent quantum algorithm is Grover’s algorithm [Grover, 1996]
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that allows quadratic speedup for brute-force attacks and therefore sets a new standards for
brute-force security for any future cryptosystems.

2.1

Quantum-resistant cryptography

There are a few different areas like lattice-based and multivariate cryptography from where
such quantum-resistant cryptosystems appeared. We are interested in cryptography algorithms based on the non-commutative groups. These algorithms use hard group theory
problems like the conjugacy search problem and the decomposition problem as their trapdoor functions. The notable examples of such cryptosystems are Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
protocol [Anshel et al., 1999], Ko-Lee protocol [Ko et al., 2000] and Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol [Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2006a]. Those protocols will be defined later in the text.
Those cryptosystems can use the wide range of non-commutative groups as their base
groups as long as there is no known efficient solution to the trapdoor function problem. One
of the first candidates to such groups were braid groups. One way to define braid group is

Bn = hσ1 . . . σn−1 | σi σi+1 σi = σi+1 σi σi+1 , σi σj = σj σi where |i − j| ≥ 2i.

There was an extensive analysis of braid groups as base groups for non-commutative
group-based cryptography and as a result of this research the number of weaknesses were
discovered and the number of attacks was suggested [F.Garside, 1969] [Birman et al., 2007]
[Franco and González-Meneses, 2003] [Gebhardt, 2005] [Gebhardt, 2006] [E. El-Rifai, 1994]
[V. Gebhardt, 2008]

[Hofheinz and Steinwandt, 2003]

[Myasnikov and Ushakov, 2007]

[Maffre, 2005]

[Longrigg and Ushakov, 2009]

[Maffre, 2006]

[Garber et al., 2006]

[Garber et al., 2005] [Hughes, 2002] [Lee and Lee, 2002] [J. Cheon, 2003]. The key problem
of braid groups is that they are linear [Bigelow, 2001]. For example, their linearity can be

CHAPTER 2. HISTORY OF CLASSIC PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

9

used to to solve group problems that make up the basis of AAG and Shpilrain-Ushakov protocols [Tsaban, 2013]. These finding are one of the reasons groups of automorphisms look
interesting as a platform for group-based cryptography. On the one hand, groups of automorphisms are complex and do not have simple solutions for problems like conjugacy search
problem. On the other hand, groups of automorphisms are not linear. Thus, they do not
have the same vulnerabilities as braid groups even though braid groups are the subgroups
of the groups of automorphisms.
Attempts were made to redeem braid groups for the group-based cryptography by
introducing algebraic eraser [Anshel et al., 2006].
Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld-Lemieux.

This protocol is also often called

Since then, a number of attacks was suggested

[Myasnikov and Ushakov, 2009] [S. Blackburn, 2016]. After the first successful attacks, a
few improvements to the original protocol were suggested [D. Atkins, 2016] [Gunnells, 2011].
Moreover, the technique of E-multiplication used in algebraic eraser is also used for the
Kayawood key agreement protocol [I. Anshel, 2017a] and Walnut digital signature algorithm
[I. Anshel, 2017b]. Walnut and Kayawood also have been studied and some strong attacks
are suggested [D. Hart, 2017] [W. Beullens, 2018] [M. Kotov, 2018].
Other than braid groups, Thompson groups that can be presented as hx0 , x1 . . . |
x−1
i xk xi = xi+1 where k > ii were tried as base groups for group-based cryptography [Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2005] but also were found to be insecure [Ruinsky et al., 2007]
[Matucci, 2008].
Yet another type of groups that look appealing is polycyclic groups. Polycyclic groups
can be defined as follows
a−1

ha1 , . . . , an | aaj i = wij , aj i = vij , arkk = ukk , for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, k ∈ Ii,
where I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and ri ∈ N of i ∈ I and wij , vij , ujj are words in generators
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aj+1 , . . . , an . Polycyclic groups were analyzed as a potential platform group for groupbased cryptography [Eick and Kahrobaei, ]. Some properties of polycyclic groups (easily
solvable word problem and hard conjugacy search and decomposition problems) were shown
[Garber et al., 2015]. But eventually ways to attack cryptosystems based on polycyclic
groups were developed [Kotov and Ushakov, ]. The main disadvantage of polycyclic groups
is the fact that they are linear, which proved to be a weakness for some classes of groups
like braid groups.
As mentioned above, groups of automorphism of a free group have some nice properties as
complex group behaviour and no known solutions for problems like conjugacy search problem
and decomposition problem. For some time, this group remained impractical because the
only known normal form of its elements is so massive that no practical usage was possible.
Dealing with normal forms of automorphisms comes down to dealing with very long words.
So there was a need to find a way to store, compare and reduce such very long words.
One possible way to solve this problem appeared from the compression techniques. The
idea is to compress very long words to a very high degree (exponential compression) and
perform all operations on them without fully decompressing them. Straight-line programs
(abbreviated as SLP) allow such level of compression. In a nutshell, SLP is a context-free
grammar that generates a single word. See Section 4 for more detail.
The next challenge was to develop algorithms to deal with words compressed using SLP
right in compressed for without fully decompressing them. Such techniques were proposed
for example in [Schleimer, 2008] [Plandowski, 1994].

Chapter 3
Preliminaries to group theory
In this section, we lay down the the basic group theory concepts that we use in our work.

3.1

Finitely presented groups

Definition 3.1.1. A group is a pair (G, ·), where G is a set and · is a binary operation on
G satisfying the following conditions:
1. For every two elements a, b ∈ G there exists a single element c ∈ G such that a · b = c.
Usually we omit the · symbol and write simply ab = c.
2. There exists an element 1 ∈ G such that for any a ∈ G

a · 1 = 1 · a = a.

1 is called the identity element.
3. For every element a ∈ G there exists an element a−1 ∈ G satisfying

aa−1 = a−1 a = 1,
11
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called the inverse of a.
4. The operation · is associative, i.e., for every a, b, c ∈ G

(a · b) · c = a · (b · c).

A subset H ⊆ G is called a subgroup of G if (H, ·) is a group itself. For a set A ⊆ G
define a set hAi of all products of elements from A and their inverses. It is easy to check that
hAi is a subgroup of G, called the subgroup generated by A. If G = hAi for some A ⊆ G,
then we say that G is generated by A or that A is a generating set for G, elements of A are
called generators. We often refer to a product of generators A and their inverses as a word
in generators A.
If the element r ∈ G defines the identity element r = 1 in group G we call r the relator
of G. Since by definition every element of group G has an inverse, every generator a of the
group G produces a relator aa−1 . Such relators are called trivial relators and every group
has them.
We say that the element w ∈ G is derivable from the set of relators R = {ri } if the
element w can be turned into identity by applying the number of the following operations:
• Removing relator ri or a trivial relator from w if it forms the consecutive block of
symbols in w.
• Inserting relator ri or a trivial relator in any position in w.
If any relator of group G can be derived from the set of relators R, we call such set a set
of defining relators or a complete set of relators.
Any group G can be defined as a pair hA; Ri where A is the set of generators and
R is the set of defining relators.

For more information see [Magnus et al., 1976] and

[Lyndon and Schupp, 2001]. We call such a pair a presentation of the group G.
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If the set A of generators of a group G is finite, we call the group G finitely generated. If
the set of the defining relators of G is also finite, we call the group G finitely presented.

3.2

Dehn problems

Dehn problems are the fundamental problems of group theory, introduced by Max Dehn
[Dehn, 1911] in 1911. They include the word problem, the conjugacy problem and the
isomorphism problem. Below we present the definitions of those problems
Word problem in G. Given a word w ∈ G decide if w =G 1.
Conjugacy problem. Given two words w1 , w2 ∈ G decide if there exists w3 ∈ G such that
w1 = w3 w2 w3−1 .
Isomorphism problem. Given the presentations for groups G1 and G2 decide whether G1
and G2 are isomorphic.
The one way to solve the word problem is to have a normal form for words in G. Normal
form norm() is such a way to present words from G that for two different presentations w1
and w2 of the same word norm(w1 ) = norm(w2 ). Having an easy-to-compute normal form
is also important for the AAG protocol because Alice and Bob should be able to compute
the shared secret key in the same form.

3.3

Group of automorphisms of the free group

We call group G a free group if there exists a subset X ⊂ G such that every element of G
can be uniquely (up to trivial combinations like xx−1 = ε) presented as a product of the
finite number of elements from X. We call the set X a free basis. We denote Fr or simply
F a free group with alphabet X = {x1 , ..., xr }. Set X is a generating set of the group G and
its elements xi ∈ X are generators.
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A homomorphism from a group G to group H is a map ϕ : G → H satisfying:

ϕ(g1 g2 ) = ϕ(g1 )ϕ(g2 )

for every g1 , g2 ∈ G. An automorphism of G is a bijective homomorphism ϕ : G → G. The
set of automorphisms of the group G is denoted by Aut(G) and forms a group (Aut(G), ◦)
under composition, called the group of automorphisms of G.
In our research, we opt to understand the product of automorphisms the following way:
for a1 , a2 ∈ Aut(F ) and a word w ∈ F (a1 a2 )(w) = a2 (a1 (w)).
Let F be a free group of rank r on the alphabet X = {x1 , . . . , xr }. The set of all automorphisms of the free group F (X) (subsequently called group F ) makes up a group Aut(F ).
We use Nielsen transformations as a generating set of Aut(F ). Nielsen transformations can
be defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.1. For a free group F on the alphabet X = {x1 , . . . , xr } Nielsen transformations are all transformations of the following form:
1. xi → x−1
where 1 ≤ i ≤ r
i
2. xi → xj and xj → xi where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r
3. xi → xi xj where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r and i 6= j
4. xi → x−1
j xi where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r and i 6= j
5. xi → x−1
j xi xj where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r and i 6= j
Nielsen transformations were introduced in [Nielsen, 1921] and a few years later in
[Nielsen, 1924] it was proven that the set of Nielsen transformations is the generating set
of Aut(F ). These results are also presented in [Magnus et al., 1976] in English. Since any
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automorphism of a free group can be presented as a sequence of Nielsen transformations
we can use Nielsen transformations to generate random automorphisms. We will present an
algorithm to do so later in this paper.
Nielsen transformations are a convenient tool for purposes like automorphism generation.
However, there is another tool worth paying attention to, namely Whitehead automorphisms.
Definition 3.3.2. Whitehead automorphisms are the automorphisms of the following form:
1. xi → x−1
where 1 ≤ i ≤ r
i
2. xi → xj and xj → xi where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r
3. for a fixed a ∈ X ± every x ∈ X ± , x 6= a± is mapped to one of the elements
x, xa, a−1 x, a−1 xa
By W (X) we denote the set of Whitehead automorphisms of type 3. In [Whitehead, 1936]
Whitehead solves the minimization problem for the words in a free group.
Definition 3.3.3. We say that the word w ∈ F is minimal if there exists no automorphism
φ such that |w| > |φ(w)|.
Definition 3.3.4. The automorphic orbit Orb(w) of a word w ∈ F is the set of all automorphic images of w in F :

Orb(w) = {v ∈ F | ∃φ ∈ Aut(F ) such that φ(w) = v}.

Minimization problem requires to find for a given word w1 ∈ G such an automorphism φ
that the word w2 = φ(w1 ) is minimal.
In [Whitehead, 1936] Whitehead proves the following theorem
Theorem 3.3.5 (Whitehead theorem). Let w1 , w2 ∈ F (X) and w2 ∈ Orb(w1 ). If |w1 | >
|w2 |, then there exists t ∈ W (X) such that |w1 | > |t(w1 )|.
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The Whitehead theorem allows to construct the minimization procedure that can be used
to disassemble the automorphism in normal form into a sequence of Whitehead automorphisms. Later, the sequence of Whitehead automophisms can be converted into a sequence
of Nielsen transformations.
However, there is a practical problem with Whitehead automorphisms - there are too
many of them for any realistically large rank of a free group F . As a result, we prefer to
use the similar result by Nielsen for the purpose of converting of an automorphism into a
sequence of Nielsen transformations.
Definition 3.3.6. Let Wi be freely-reduced words on alphabet X = {xj }. The set of words
{Wi } is called Nielsen reduced if the following conditions are met for every word V (Wi ) in
symbols Wi :
• Each W -symbol occurring in the word V (Wi ) contributes at least one x-symbol to the
freely-reduced form of V (Wi (xj )).
• The number of x-symbols in V (Wi (xj )) is at least as large as the number of x-symbols
in any Wi occurring in V (Wi ).
Theorem 3.3.7. Let W = {W1 ...Wm } be a finite m-tuple of freely reduced words in the free
generators {xj }. Then we can find a sequence τ1 ...τk of Nielsen transformations of rank m
such that:
|W | ≤ |τ1 W | ≤ ... ≤ |τk ...τ1 W |
and
τk ...τ1 W = {W̃1 ...W̃m }
where {W̃1 ...W̃t } and W̃t+1 = 1, ... ,W̃m = 1
This theorem also allows to disassemble the automorphism in normal form into a sequence
of Nielsen transformations. However, the number of Nielsen transformations is much smaller
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than the number of Whitehead automorphisms for the same rank and that allows faster
conversions.
Presenting a given automorphism as a sequence of Nielsen transformations has a certain
security advantages that will be discussed further.

3.4

Length of an automorphism

In our work, we use a length-based attack to analyze the security properties of Aut(F ). As it
follows from its very name, we need length measurement for the length-based attack. In this
section we define the length function for automorphisms. Initially, it feels natural to define
the length of an automorphism as a minimum number of Nielsens transformations that form
it. But such length measurement requires either storing the automorphism as a sequence of
Nielsen transformations or having an algorithm to quickly convert the automorphism to that
form. Both possibilities are discussed in Section 10.2 and they turn out to be complicated.
So we opt for a different definition of length. We define the length of an automorphism φ
as a sum of lengths of all reduced images of all the generators of the free group F . Further,
we will analyze the properties of this length measure and show that it fits the length-based
attack well.
|φ| =

R
X

|φ(xi )|,

i=1

where xi are the generators of group F .
In our paper we keep calling the suggested measure length, but strictly speaking it is
not a length. The proposed measure lacks additivity. Recall that a length function is an
additive function which means that f (gh) = f (g) + f (h) for any g and h in the function’
domain. Our function does not satisfy this condition. For our measure, it is possible that
for g, h ∈ Aut(F ) the additive property is violated and |gh| =
6 |g| + |h|. It might be more
correct to call this measure size, but since we use it for length-based attack we keep calling
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it length for the sake of uniformity. Even though the suggested measure does not have the
additive property, it suits our needs well. It is relatively easy to compute and it preserves
the crucial property of the length of an automorphism usually increasing when multiplied
by another automorphism. In Section 7.1 we discuss why this property is important and
in Section 7.2 we discuss situations when the length-increasing property of the suggested
measurement does not hold.

3.5

Problems in the group of automorphisms

The Aut(F ) group can be viewed as a promising base group for the AAG protocol because
its word problem can be efficiently solved but there is no known way to solve the conjugacy
search problem for Aut(F ) efficiently. The basic version of the conjugacy search problem
can be stated as follows
Conjugacy search problem in G. Given two elements w1 , w2 ∈ G find an element x ∈ G
such that w2 = x−1 w1 x.
As we already mentioned above there is no efficient solution to conjugacy problem in
Aut(F ). But it is not enough to solve conjugacy problem to break the AAG protocol. To do
it we need to solve an even more complex version of the conjugacy problem, namely subgrouprestricted simultaneous conjugacy problem or two different simultaneous conjugacy search
problems. This topic is discussed in [Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2006b].
Simultaneous conjugacy search problem.

Given tuples ḡ = {g1 , ..., gk } and h̄ =

{h1 , ..., hk } of elements of G, find an element x ∈ G such that ḡ = x−1 h̄x, i.e., solve the
following system of conjugacy equations
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g1 = x−1 h1 x



...




 gk = x−1 hk x
Subgroup-restricted simultaneous conjugacy search problem in G. Given a subgroup A generated by the set ā, tuples ḡ = {g1 , ..., gk } and h̄ = {h1 , ..., hk } of elements of G,
find an element x ∈ A as a product of elements of ā such that ḡ = x−1 h̄x.
On the other hand, the word problem in Aut(F ) has a solution. In case of the Aut(F )
group, the normal form of an automorphism φ ∈ Aut(F ) can be obtained by calculating the
images φ(x) of all letters x of the alphabet X.
Definition 3.5.1. For an automorphism φ ∈ Aut(F ) we define a normal form as norm(φ) =
{φ(x1 ), ..., φ(xR )} where X = {x1 , ..., xR } is the alphabet of X.
This definition of normal form leads us to a natural way to measure an automorphism’s
length.
Definition 3.5.2. The length of an automorphism φ ∈ Aut(F ) is |φ| =

P

x∈X

|φ(x)| where

X is the alphabet.
Such a normal form and length measure seem very fitting and convenient but they have
the potential problem. The problem is that for realistically complex automorphisms the
images of the letters of X are very long. If we multiply an automorphism by the Nielsen
transformations we should expect the exponential growth of its length. For example, in our
experiments we were constantly dealing with automorphisms whose images of the letters of
X had the lengths of an order of 1028 . Thus, the lengths of the images of X quickly get so
large that no straight-forward brute-force approach can be feasible even on the most powerful
computers. We require special approaches and algorithms to work with images of X. Such
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special approaches and algorithms can be found in the field of straight-line programs or
simply SLPs. On the one hand, SLPs allow us to store images of X in a heavily compressed
form. On the other hand, SLPs allow us to perform operations on these images right in
compressed form without decompressing them.

3.6

Random automorphisms generation

As discussed above, any automorphism from Aut(F ) can be presented as a sequence of
Nielsen transformations. We use this fact to generate random automorphisms. The algorithm
to do so is
Algorithm Generation of a random automorphism
1. Set the number N of the Nielsen transformations that will make up the random automorphism.
2. Choose the random Nielsen transformation of type 3 or 4.
3. Choose the random Nielsen transformation of type 3 or 4. Check for possible cancellations with the already existing sequence. If nothing cancels out, add this Nielsen
transformation to the sequence. Repeat this step N − 1 times.
4. Choose a random integer number i from 1 to 2R where R is the size of the alphabet
X. If i ≤ R add xi → x−1
to the sequence of Nielsen transformations.
i
The method described above has some potential issues with the automorphism’s length.
We defined the length of an automorphism as the sum of lengths of images of X. The
above algorithm does not allow us to generate an automorphism of the given length. Indeed,
the same number of Nielsen transformations can generate automorphisms of different lengths.
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In practice we need this algorithm of a random automorphism generation to generate
the public sets of Alice and Bob. The elements of those sets are small so it is possible to
estimate their length. Our observations show that the algorithm performed sufficiently well
and produced the automorphisms of the expected length.

Chapter 4
Introduction to straight-line programs
In this section, we present straight-line programs (or SLPs for short). Straight-line programs
are our main tool for presenting automorphisms in the computations. The efficiency of SLPs
immediately affects the efficiency of the automorphisms in our experiments.

4.1

Straight-line programs

Definition 4.1.1. Straight-line program (SLP) over a terminal alphabet X = {x1 , ..., xR } is
a context-free grammar G = {V, X, S, P } where V is the set of nonterminal symbols, X is
the set of terminal symbols, S ∈ V is the starting nonterminal symbol, and P is the set of
production rules where each nonterminal symbol Vi ∈ V has exactly one production rule of
one of the following forms:
• Vi → x where x ∈ X.
• Vi → Vj Vk where Vj , Vk ∈ V and j, k < i.
Every straight-line program describes a single word w(S). We can define the word produced by the nonterminal symbol v ∈ V the following way:
22
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if P (v) = 



w(v) =
x
if P (v) = x ∈ X




 w(A)w(B) if P (v) = AB
The length of this word can grow exponentially when we increase the number of production rules. It allows us to use SLPs representing words in a highly compressed form.
The depth of an SLP P is depth(S). The depth of a terminal symbol v ∈ V is defined as
follows


 1
if P (v) = x ∈ X ∪ {}
depth(v) =

 1 + max(w(A), w(B)) if P (v) = AB

4.2

Operations on SLPs

In this section we mention the existence and complexities of the important algorithms that
deal with SLPs. These algorithms make the operation on automorphisms presented as SLPs
possible. All these algorithms are nicely described in [Miasnikov et al., 2011].
Word segments algorithms. Firstly, there is an algorithm that takes an input of an
SLP P and an integer number α ∈ [1, |w(P)|] and returns an SLP P 0 such that w(P 0 ) =
w(P)[: α]. Symmetrically, there is an algorithm that takes an input of an SLP P and an
integer number α ∈ [1, |w(P)|] and returns an SLP P 0 such that w(P 0 ) = w(P)[α :]. These
algorithms allow specifying the initial and terminal segments correspondingly of a word in
form of SLP. It is important to mention that the resulting word is also presented in form of
SLP and all manipulations are carried out on SLP without any decompression.
The above algorithms for obtaining the initial and terminal segments of an SLP-presented
word can be combined to get the algorithm that produces the SLP representing a middle
segment of the word. This algorithm takes an input of an SLP P and an integer numbers
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0 ≥ α ≥ β ≥ |w(P)| and returns an SLP P 0 such that w(P 0 ) = w(P)[α : β].
All three algorithms presented in this section have a good complexity O(depth(P)).
Word inversion. Simple algorithm allows taking an SLP P that defines a word w(P)
and returning an SLP P 0 which defines a word w(P 0 ) = (w(P))−1 . The only thing this
algorithm does is to change all original production rules of P according to the following rule


 x−1 if P (v) = x ∈ X ∪ {}
0 0
P (v ) =
 BA if P (v) = AB

The word inversion algorithm has a complexity O(|P|).

4.3

Automorphisms presented in form of SLPs

In the case of automophisms, we can use SLPs to present the images of letters of X in
compressed form. Since SLPs can potentially provide us with exponential compression it
becomes possible to store the above-defined normal forms of automorphisms in computer
memory.
One can argue that SLPs are not guaranteed to provide exponential compression. Indeed,
the SLP presentation of a random word from X ∗ can provide no significant compression. But
in case of automorphisms we deal not with random words in X ∗ but with words generated by
the automorphisms from letters of X. Each automorphism can be presented as the sequence
of Nielsen transformations. Nielsen transformations are very similar to production rules of
SLPs. The starting non-terminal symbol S of the SPL is similar to the letter x ∈ X that
is mapped to the word represented by the SLP. Hence, we can expect that the number of
production rules of the SLP that represents an image of a certain letter x ∈ X is similar
to the number of Nielsen transformations that make up the automorphism. Of cause, there
is no strictly defined correlation between them, but the high level of compression is to be
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expected.
However, just storing automorphisms in computer memory is not enough. We need to
perform basic operations on automorphisms such as comparing two automorphisms, multiplying them, performing free reduction of an automorphism, computing the automorphisms
length. Since the uncompressed forms of automorphisms can be huge, we cannot deal with
the uncompressed forms. We need algorithms that allow dealing with automorphisms in
the compressed form. Because we present an automorphism φ ∈ Aut(F ) as a set of images
norm(φ) = {φ(x1 ), ...φ(xR )}, the problem of dealing with automorphisms in a compressed
form is equivalent to the problem of dealing with words from X ∗ in a compressed form. The
techniques that allow doing so (like the technique to reduce the word in the compressed
form) were described in a number of papers, for example [Schleimer, 2008] [Lohrey, 2012]
[Jez, 2015] [Lifshits, 2007].
For our experiments we used a C++ library written by Dmitry Panteleev and Pavel
Morar. This library provides classes for efficient storage and manipulations on automorphisms. The library is based primarily on the algorithms described in [Lifshits, 2007].

Chapter 5
Complexity of operations on the
automorphisms presented in the form
of the SLPs
In our complexity evaluations, we care mostly for reductions and multiplications (or rather
conjugations that is two multiplications at a time). The complexity of reduction operation
is discussed in [Miasnikov et al., 2011]. It it proven there that the complexity of reduction
of a word W presented as SLP P is O(|P|7 ) where |P| is the number of production rules in
P. This is a high complexity and later we present the actual measurements of how expensive
reduction is in practice.
Another operation on automorphisms that is theoretically complex is equality test. We
check the equality of two automorphisms by checking if the images of the letters from X
match. Since each image is presented in the SLP form, one needs Plandowski’s algorithm
[Plandowski, 1994] that decides if two SLPs PA and PB define the same word. The complexity of the Plandowski’s algorithm is O((|PA |+|PB |)5 ) where |PA | is the number of production
rules in PA and |PB | is the number of production rules in PB . However, Plandowski’s algo26
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rithm considers reduced and non-reduced versions of the same word to be different. Thus,
to use it, we need to reduce both words presented by the SLPs PA and PB . Considering
the complexity of reduction discussed above, we get the following total cost of comparison
O((|PA | + |PB |)5 + |PA |7 + |PB |7 ) = O(|PA |7 + |PB |7 ).
Checking the equality of two words presented in an SLP form looks like a complex
procedure. However, in practice it is possible to do the set of simple checks that gives us the
answer fast. For example, before applying the Plandowski’s algorithm we can just compare
the length of the images of letters of X and if these lengths are different we have the negative
answer fast. After all, the equality checks can be fast most of the time especially for SLPs
presenting the already reduced words. One more observation, LBA attacks require minimal
amounts of equality checks.
The operation that LBA attacks require a lot is the length measurement. Fortunately,
funding the length of the word W presented by the SLP P is a simple straightforward task of
linear complexity O(|P|). It requires one addition operation per each nonterminal symbol.
Algorithm Computing the length of the word W described by the SLP P
1. Determine the length of the image of each nonterminal symbol Vi starting from i = 0
following the rule:
• if the production rule for Vi is of the form Vi → x then the length of the image
|Vi | = 1.
• if the production rule for Vi is of the form Vi → Vj Vk then the length of the image
|Vi | = |Vj | + |Vk |
2. The length of the image of the last nonterminal symbol is the length of the word W
described by P.
It is worth mentioning that since the lengths of nonterminal symbols tend to grow expo-
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nentially, the additions in the above algorithm require long integer arithmetic and are not
as fast as a usual integer addition.
The next important operation on automorphisms is inversion. There is no known algorithm that allows inverting an automorphism stored in the form of SLP. We solve this
problem by keeping the inverted form of the automorphism together with its original form.
It makes the inverse of the automorphism instantly available but significantly increases the
duration of other operations like multiplication and assignment. Also, it increases the memory consumption of our program. The inverse of a new automorphism is obtained during
its generation since we generate a new automorphism by multiplying a number of Nielsen
transformations and we can easily invert the sequence of Nielsen transformations.
Another operation that is very important for LBA attacks is multiplication of two automorphisms. In theory, this operation is simple O(|X|2 ) where |X| is the number of terminal
symbols. However, in practice the particular implementation that we are dealing with requires a significant amount of memory-related operations. Later we will provide the actual
measurements of how fast the multiplication of two automorphisms is in the library that we
are using.

Chapter 6
Protocols of group-based
cryptography
Here are the examples of some typical protocols of group-based cryptography. The main
interest of our research is the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol but the results are relevant
for all conjugacy-search-based and decomposition-based protocols.

6.1

Protocol description

Let Aut(F ) be a group of all automorphisms of a free group F of rank R. The set of Nielsen
transformations {N ili } is the generating set of Aut(F ). We implement the Anshel-AnshelGoldfeld protocol on the platform group Aut(F ). Protocol steps are:
Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol
• Alice randomly generates N1 -tuple of words from F

ā = {a1 , . . . , aN1 }

Tuple ā is called Alice’s public set. The number of Nielsen transformations used to
29
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generate each element of this tuple is LA .
• Bob randomly generates N2 -tuple of words from F

b̄ = {b1 , . . . , bN2 }

Tuple b̄ is called Bob’s public set. The number of Nielsen transformations used to
generate each element of this tuple is LB .
• Alice randomly generates a product A = aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL , where 0 < si ≤ N1 and εi = ±1
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ L. The word A is called Alice’s private key.
• Bob randomly generates a product B = bδt11 bδt22 . . . bδtLL , where 0 < ti ≤ N2 and δi = ±1
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ L. The word B is called Bob’s private key.
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N2 Alice computes b0i = A−1 bi A and makes them reduced. Then Alice
transmits all b0i to Bob.
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N1 Bob computes a0i = B −1 ai B and makes them reduced. Then Bob
transmits all a0i to Alice.
0εL
−1 −1
1 0ε2
• Alice computes KA = A−1 a0ε
s1 as2 . . . asL = A B AB.
−1 −1
L
2 0−δ1
• Bob computes KB = b0−δ
. . . b0−δ
tL
t2 bt1 B = A B AB.

One can see that KA = KB so K = KA = KB is now a shared secret key of Alice and
Bob.
The AAG protocol itself does not require any specific techniques of Alice’s and Bob’s
private keys generation. And it means that generating Alice’s secret key A for example
can be as simple as generating a random sequence of sL elements of ā and doing sL − 1
automorphism multiplications. Of course, when generating the random sequence we must
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make sure that adjacent elements of this sequence does not cancel each other out. Strictly
speaking, things can get more complicated if a lot of elements of ā commute with each other
but controlling the length of A is still easy.
In order to obtain the shared secret key, the attacker must obtain the Alice’s private
key A and the Bob’s private key B. This will allow constructing the shared private key
K = A−1 B −1 AB. To do it, the attacker has to solve the simultaneous conjugacy search
problem for sets ā and ā0 , and the simultaneous conjugacy search problem for sets b̄ and
b̄0 . The shared secret key can be computed from the know Alice’s private key A alone by
0εL
−1 −1
1 0ε2
computing K = KA = A−1 a0ε
s1 as2 . . . asL = A B AB. But to do it the attacker needs to

know the Alice’s private key as a word in ā, A = aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL . Symmetrically, the shared
secret key can be obtained from knowing B = bδt11 bδt22 . . . bδtLL as a word in b̄. Thus, the attacker
needs to solve only one conjugacy search problem, but since now the private key should
be found as a product of given generators, the attacker should solve a different version of
conjugacy search problem, namely the subgroup-restricted simultaneous conjugacy search
problem.
The AAG protocol can be used on different platform groups.

For example,

[Myasnikov and Ushakov, 2007] analyses the AAG protocol used with braid groups. In this
paper, we analyze the AAG properties when used on the platform of Aut(F ).
However, the LBA that we will describe here can be used to attack other encryption protocols that use the complexity of conjugacy search problem or even decomposition problem.
We can mention just two such protocols - Ko-Lee [Ko et al., 2000] and Ushakov-Shpilrain
[Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2006a].
Ko-Lee protocol
• Alice and Bob agree on publicly visible group G and two of its subgroups A ⊂ G and
B ⊂ G such that for any x ∈ A and y ∈ B xy = yx. Also Alice and Bob agree on a
word w ∈ G.
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• Alice chooses her private key a ∈ A.
• Bob chooses his private key b ∈ B.
• Alice computes a normal form of a−1 wa and sends it to Bob.
• Bob computes a normal form of b−1 wb and sends it to Alice.
• Alice computes a normal form of Ka = a−1 (b−1 wb)a.
• Bob computes a normal form of Kb = b−1 (a−1 wa)b.
Since subgroups A and B commute, ab = ba so Ka = Kb = K where K is the shared
secret key.
The attack on the Ko-Lee protocol is similar to the attack on AAG. You just consider the
set b̄0 to contain the single element b̄0 = {a−1 wa}, b̄ to contain the single element b̄ = {w} and
the set ā to contain the generating elements of the subgroup A from the Ko-Lee protocol.
Furthermore, the attack is simplified by the fact that it is enough to solve the basic conjugacy
search problem. Indeed, if we find the Alice’s private key a in any generators by solving the
conjugacy search problem for the word w and the publicly available a−1 wa, we can compute
the shared secret key K = a−1 (b−1 wb)a because b−1 wb is also public. Symmetrically, the
same applies to finding the Bob’s private key b from w and b−1 wb.
The Ushakov-Shpilrain protocol deals with the decomposition problem rather than conjugacy problem so LBA should be less efficient. Still LBA attack can be attempted on it.
Here is the Ushakov-Shpilrain protocol itself.
Ushakov-Shpilrain protocol
• Alice and Bob publicly agree on a word w ∈ G.
• Alice chooses an element a1 ∈ G, chooses a subgroup of CG (a1 ), and publishes its
generators A = {α1 , ..., αk }.
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• Bob chooses an element b2 ∈ G, chooses a subgroup of CG (b2 ), and publishes its
generators B = {β1 , ..., βm }.
• Alice chooses an element a2 in hβ1 , ..., βm i and sends the normal form PA = a1 wa2 to
Bob.
• Bob chooses an element b1 in hα1 , ..., αk i and sends the normal form PB = b1 wb2 to
Bob.
• Alice computes KA = a1 PB a2 .
• Bob computes KB = b1 PA b2 .
Since a1 b1 = b1 a1 and a2 b2 = b2 a2 , we have K = KA = KB the shared secret key.
The Ushakov-Shpilrain protocol adds significant complications for the attacker because
now instead of conjugacy search problem the attacker must solve even more complicated
decomposition problem. The decomposition problem is the problem of finding words x, y ∈ G
while being given the words w1 ∈ G and w2 = xw1 y ∈ G.

Chapter 7
Length-based attack
We evaluate the suitability of Aut(F ) for group-based cryptography by trying to solve the
conjugacy search problem using the length-based attack. If we are able to solve conjugacy
search problem, we can compute private keys of Alice and Bob and eventually the shared
secret key.

7.1

Fundamentals of length-based attack

To break an instance of AAG encryption one must find a shared secret key K = A−1 B −1 AB
using publicly shared data (which is the sets ā, b̄, ā0 , b̄0 ). It is easy to see that for finding the key K = A−1 B −1 AB it is sufficient to find A as a product of generating elements
from ā because having A = aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL and set a0 we can construct K = A−1 B −1 AB =
0εL
1 0ε2
A−1 a0ε
s1 as2 . . . asL . Symmetrically, it is sufficient to find B as a product of generating ele-

ments from b̄ to find K.
e ∈ ha1 , . . . , aN1 i
In fact, by [Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2006b], it is sufficient to find such A
e−1 bi A
e for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N2 , i.e., to solve subgroup-restricted simultaneous conjugacy
that b0i = A
problem, i.e., solve the following system of conjugacy equations
34
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e−1 b1 A
e

b0 = A


 1
e ∈ ha1 , . . . , aN1 i
, where A
...




 b0 = A
e−1 bN2 A
e
N2
e can be used for computing a shared key K. Symmetrically, it is sufficient to
Any such A
e −1 ai B
e for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N1 .
e ∈ hb1 , . . . , bN2 i that a0i = B
find such B
The length-based attack attempts finding the elements aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL = A using the
elements of set b0 .

The underlying fact used for the length-based attack is that the

length of an automorphism usually increases when multiplied by another automorphism,
so |A−1 bi A| > |A−1 bi | > |bi | with high probability. This brings out the problem of defining
a way to measure the length of an automorphism. We introduced the length function for
automorphisms in Section 3.4
Now lets take a look at a single element b0i
−ε2 −ε1
ε1 ε2
εL
L
b0i = A−1 bi A = a−ε
sL . . . as2 as1 bi as1 as2 . . . asL

Because of the above-mentioned property that usually conjugation increases the length of
the automorphism, we can assume that

−εL−1
−ε2 −ε1
ε1 ε2
εL−1
L
|b0i | < |aεsLL b0i a−ε
sL | = |asL−1 . . . as2 as1 bi as1 as2 . . . asL−1 |

L
We can say that the conjugation of b0i by a−ε
sL peels off the outermost element that make up

−ε

L−1 −εL
L
b0i . We can go further and conjugate b0i by asL−1
asL instead of just a−ε
sL . With the high

probability that depends on elements as and the way A is generated, it will decrease the
length even further because it peels off two automorphisms from each side of b0i instead of
just one, so
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εL εL−1 0 −εL−1 −εL
L
|b0i | > |aεsLL b0i a−ε
sL | > |asL asL−1 bi asL−1 asL | =
εL−2
ε1
−ε1
L−1
= |a−ε
sL−2 . . . as1 bi as1 . . . asL−1 |

By making further steps in this direction we hope to come to the point when, after the
next step of length reduction, we end up with the sequence S of elements of Alice’s public
set that reduces the length of b̄0 to the length of b̄ when you conjugate b̄0 by it. Further,
e ∈ ha1 , . . . , aN1 i. As we have discussed in the
if S −1 b̄0 S = b̄, then we have that S −1 = A
beginning of this section, it is enough to compute the shared secret key K.

7.2

Length-based attack with backtracking

The idea discussed above is used for the length-based attack (subsequently called the LBA).
The LBA we present next uses backtracking and will work even if at some point there are
multiple elements of Alice’s public set that can shorten the current automorphism. Later in
this paper, we will discuss the way to improve it further. In the algorithm below, the length
of the set of automorphisms should be understood as the sum of lengths of all automorphisms
in the set.
Algorithm LBA with backtracking
1. Initialize a set S = {(b̄0 , 1)}, where 1 is the identity element of Aut(F ).
2. If S = 0 then output FAIL.
3. Choose a pair (c, x) ∈ S with the least |cx |.


4. For each i = 1 . . . N1 and each  = ±1 compute ∆i, = |cx | − |cxai |.


• If cxai = b̄ then output the final result (xai )−1 .
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• If ∆i, > 0 then add (c, xai ) to the set S.
5. Delete (c, x) from the set S.
6. Go to Step 2.
As we have already mentioned the whole LBA is based on a heuristic fact that the length
of an automorphism usually increases when multiplied by another automorphism. With high
ε

εL
probability when we multiply aεs11 . . . asL−1
L−1 by asL the length of the resulting automorphism

increases. But what happens if such multiplication actually decreases the length? It means
L
that on Step 4 of the algorithm ∆−
sL ≤ 0 and consequently the algorithm will not be able

to find asLL component of A and, as a result, will not be able to find A.
Fail condition: if for Alice’s private key A = aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL there exists 1 < i ≤ L such
ε

ε

i−1 εi
ε1
that |aεs11 . . . asi−1
i−1 | ≥ |as1 . . . asi−1 asi | then the length-based attack with backtracking fails.

We say that a peak happens in the i-th position in A.
There is a significant chance of the above condition being met for some parameters of
AAG. To be more specific, the above fail condition happens more often for parameters with
a large rank R of the free group F and a small amount of Nielsen transformations forming
each element of the Alice’s public set ā. In Table 7.1 you can see the results of the LBA
attack with backtracking. In each cell we put the percentage of successful attacks. Each
percentage is calculated based on 20 experiments. Alice’s private key is generated by 40
elements from Alice’s public set. Rows track the number of Nielsen transformations that
make up each element of Alice’s and Bob’s public sets. Columns track the rank of a free
group F . An experiment is successful if it finds the Alice’s private key within 30 hours.
The next interesting question is this: What makes the above-mentioned fail condition
for the LBA with backtracking become true. Based on our observations that follow the
idea from [Myasnikov and Ushakov, 2007], the most frequent pattern that activates the fail
∓1
condition is this: Somewhere in the Alice’s private key A there is a fragment a±1
such
i aj ai
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Rank 10

Rank 15

Rank 20

70%
90%
95%
100%

40%
50%
85%
85%

15%
45%
50%
65%

Table 7.1: Success rate of classic LBA attack with backtracking
∓1
±1
±1
∓1
that |a±1
often also causes the LBA to fail.
i aj ai | ≤ |ai aj |. The inverse of such ai aj ai
∓1
On the one hand, the chance for a fragment of a form a±1
to appear in a randomly
i aj ai

generated Alice’s private key is significant. The smaller is the Alice’s private set, the higher
∓1
±1
this chance is. On the other hand, the chance of |a±1
i aj ai | ≤ |ai aj | is also significant when

the rank R of the free group F is relatively large and the elements of Alice’s private set are
generated by a small number of Nielsen transformations. To check if this case really attribute
to the majority of LBA fails we have encountered in our experiments, we analyzed all failed
LBA experiments from the Table 7.1. The results of this analysis are presented in Table
7.2. In each cell we state how many times in the failed experiments Alice’s secret key had a
∓1
∓1
±1
such that |a±1
fragment of the form a±1
i aj ai
i aj ai | ≤ |ai aj |. For example, 3/6 means that

in 3 out of 6 unsuccessful experiments an Alice’s private key contained such segment.
Number of Nielsen
transformations
6
7
8
9

Rank 10

Rank 15

Rank 20

3/6
2/2
0/1
0/0

10/12
7/10
1/3
1/3

14/17
7/11
8/10
4/7

Table 7.2: Failures because of specific patterns
The initial analysis that we performed for Table 7.2 is too primitive to capture the
potentially complex behaviour of automorphisms. Therefore, we are not claiming that the
presented numbers indicate the problem precisely. Nevertheless, they show that the case
we have described above is the potential troublemaker for the LBA and it might be worth
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it investigating it further. Also, this result explains the regularity that we observe in the
experiments with the LBA with backtracking (see Table 7.1) that the longer the elements
of the Alice’s public set are and the smaller is the rank of F the better the LBA performs.
Indeed, the longer the two automorphisms ai and aj are the smaller is the chance that
∓1
∓1
±1
a±1
such that |a±1
i aj ai
i aj ai | ≤ |ai aj |. Also, that is the reason why we tend to conduct

our experiments with shorter elements of the Alice’s public set, to focus our attention on the
most problematic area.

7.3

Enhanced LBA

From Table 7.2 it can be concluded that the case described above causes the significant part
of LBA failures. [Myasnikov and Ushakov, 2007] suggests to enhance the standard LBA with
backtracking to enable it handling this problematic situation. In this extended attack, it is
suggested to run the usual LBA with backtracking but on an extended set of Alice’s public
automorphisms, rather than on the original set ā. In our case, this extended set contains
∓
all automorphisms of the original set ā, plus all conjugates a±
i aj ai of pairs ai , aj ∈ ā where
∓
±
1 ≤ i, j ≤ N1 and i 6= j for which |a±
i aj ai | ≤ |ai aj |. Also, we add to the extended set all
±
± ±
±
products a±
i aj of pairs ai , aj ∈ a where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N1 and i 6= j for which |ai aj | ≤ |ai |.

These elements that we use for the LBA along with the original set ā hide inside them
the most probable cases of fail condition being true. For example, if a decrease in length
−1
−1
−1
happens when we multiply a−1
i aj by ai ( |ai aj ai | ≤ |ai aj |) and if the fragment ai aj ai

appears in the Alice’s private key, the proposed enhanced LBA is still able to handle it.
Still, it is not able to correctly find the a−1
step but it does not need to. The enhanced
j
0
LBA has the whole conjugate a−1
i aj ai in its extended guessing set and it can conjugate b by
−1
(a−1
i aj ai ) .

The following algorithm is used to create an extended guessing set for the Enhanced
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LBA.
Algorithm Create an extended set
1. Initialize set Ext = ā.
ε

ε

2. For all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N1 , and all εi , εj = ±1 for which |aεi i aj j | ≤ |ai | add aεi i aj j to Ext.
εi
εi
−εi
i
3. For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N1 , i 6= j and all εi = ±1 for which |aεi i aj a−ε
i | ≤ |ai aj | add ai aj ai

to Ext.
Then we formulate the algorithm of the enhanced LBA:
Algorithm Enhanced LBA
1. Run the Create an extended set algorithm to create the set Ext.
2. Initialize a set S = {(b̄0 , 1)}, where 1 is the identity element of Aut(FR ).
3. If S = 0 then output FAIL.
4. Choose a pair (c, x) ∈ S with the least |cx |.


5. For each ξ ∈ Ext and each  = ±1 compute ∆i, = |cx | − |cxξi |.


• If cxξi = b̄ then output the final result (xξi )−1 .
• If ∆i, > 0 then add (c, xξi ) to the set S.
6. Delete (c, x) from the set S.
7. Go to Step 3.
It is to be expected that for some parameters the extended set Ext will be much larger
than the Alice’s public set ā. Because of that the extended LBA algorithm can run much
longer compared to the classic LBA with backtracking, so later we will propose some optimizations to speed up the enhanced LBA.
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Rank 10

Rank 15

Rank 20

85%
100%
95%
100%

75%
80%
100%
95%

40%
90%
85%
85%

Table 7.3: Success rate of enhanced LBA on the extended guessing set
In Table 7.3 you can see the performance of the enhanced LBA.
Table 7.3 shows the significant improvement in efficiency of the enhanced LBA over the
standard LBA with backtracking. The improvements are most obvious on larger ranks of F
and shorter elements of ā, where the standard LBA lacks efficiency.

7.4

Properties of the b̄ set

Next, we try to decrease the computational load of the suggested LBA attacks on AAG
protocol. One way to make the LBA attacks more efficient is to use not all the public data
but only the useful part of it. We examine the public set b̄0 and try to understand what part
of b̄0 we really need for the efficient LBA attack.
In our experiments we use the public set of Bob b̄ with 10 automorpisms in it. As a result,
we have 10 automorphisms in the set b̄0 . This means that when we guess the next element
from ā that decreases the total length of b̄0 , we perform all 10 conjugations and reductions,
one for each element of the b̄0 .
But the size of b̄0 has a very little effect on the whole procedure of LBA. Theoretically,
it is possible for some element of bi to interact with the Alice’s private key in a specific way
to interfere with the LBA. Alice’s private key can be presented as a sequence of elements
ε1
1
from ā: A = aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL . Then the situation in which |a−ε
s1 bi as1 | ≤ |bi | poses the potential

problem, because it does not allow LBA to correctly guess as1 . In this case, other elements
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Rank 10

Rank 15

Rank 20

0.13%
0.01%
0%
0%

0.46%
0.11%
0.01%
0%

1.31%
0.3%
0.11%
0.01%

ε1
1
Table 7.4: Chance of |a−ε
s1 bi as1 | ≤ |bi |

of b̄0 will still show the right way for the LBA.
ε1
1
Intuitively, it looks like the chance of |a−ε
s1 bi as1 | ≤ |bi | for randomly generated bi and as1

is rather small. To evaluate this intuition we have conducted the number of experiments.
For all parameters that we used in our experiments we were generating many random bi and
ε1
1
as1 and check if any of these pairs satisfy the condition |a−ε
s1 bi as1 | ≤ |bi |. For a given rank

r of free group F and number of Nielsen automorphisms L the experiment can be described
the following way:
1. Generate random bi ∈ Aut(F ) which is L Nielsen transformations long.
2. Generate random as1 ∈ Aut(F ) which is L Nielsen transformations long.
3. If |a−1
s1 bi as1 | ≤ |bi |, then experiment is successful. Otherwise the experiment is a failure.
The results of these experiments are presented in Table 7.4. Each cell contains the
percentage of successful experiments, based on 10000 experiments.
From the Table 7.4 it can be concluded that for a randomly generated bi and as1 the
−1 −1
chance of |a−1
s1 bi as1 | ≤ |bi | is very low. Theoretically, it is also possible that |as2 as1 bi as1 as2 | ≤

|a−1
s1 bi as1 | while |as1 as2 | > |as1 |, but the chance of that happening should be even smaller.
We can conclude that most of the time when we minimize the total length of the set b̄0 ,
problems come from the Alice’s private key A, and not from the elements of b̄. With these
considerations in mind, we can opt to use not the whole set b̄0 but a part of it. There is no
reason to use all elements of b̄0 so we modify our enhanced LBA in the following way:
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Algorithm Enhanced LBA on partial b̄
1. Run the Create an extended set algorithm to create set Ext.
2. Choose a parameter P ∈ N such that 0 < P ≤ N2 . Create a set b¯00 out of the first P
elements of the set b̄0
3. Initialize a set S = {(b¯00 , 1)}, where 1 is the identity element of Aut(F ).
4. If S = 0 then output FAIL.
5. Choose a pair (c, x) ∈ S with the least |cx |.


6. For each ξ ∈ Ext and each  = ±1 compute ∆i, = |cx | − |cxξi |.
• If b̄0

xξi

= b̄ then output the final result (xξi )−1 .

• If ∆i, > 0 then add (c, xξi ) to the set S.
7. Delete (c, x) from the set S.
8. Go to Step 3.
For our experiments we use P from 1 to 5 depending on other parameters.
Since we introduced this improvement for the enhanced LBA, we also introduced it to
the classic LBA with backtracking. We have rerun all classic LBA experiments, which failed
to complete in 30 hours, but this time we used only a part of b0 set (exactly the same
part of b0 that we have used for the same enhanced LBA experiment). If the classic LBA
with backtracking is successful on the partial b0 set, we consider it successful. If the classic
LBA with backtracking is successful only on the full set b̄, we still consider the experiment
successful, though we never observed such a situation in practice. Table 7.1 already accounts
for this rule. In fact, none of the failed classic LBA experiments succeeded on partial b0 , but
these additional experiments make Table 7.1 and Table 7.3 comparable.
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We tried the enhanced LBA for the same problems that we used for the standard LBA
with backtracking. This way you can compare Table 7.1 and Table 7.3.
The idea of using just a part of b̄0 set helps to significantly reduce the computational
complexity of LBA and it works good for longer automorphisms of ā and b̄. But if these
automorphisms are short and LBA starts to struggle with extensive backtracking, ignoring
the part of b̄0 can theoretically lead to even more backtracking. This additional backtracking
can easily overweight the benefits of shrinking the set b̄0 .
To avoid this problem we suggest yet another way to optimize the use of b̄0 . We call it
compressing the set b̄0 .
Algorithm Compressing b̄0
1. Compute the product p of all elements of b̄0 .
2. Reduce p.
3. Consider p to be the only element of compressed b̄0 .
Compressed set b̄0 can be used in any LBA instead of original b̄0 . On the one hand, it
reduces the chance of Alice’s private key canceling out with itself in b̄0 . On the other hand,
using the compressed b̄0 was about two times faster than using the original set b̄0 in our
experiments.

7.5

Further improvements to the enhanced LBA

In this section, we try to increase the efficiency of the LBA attacks further. We do it by
finding more probable peak-generating patterns to include them in the extended guessing
set Ext. The enhanced LBA already offers some significant improvement over the classic
LBA with backtracking. Still, the enhanced LBA can be improved.
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The group Aut(F ) has a complex behavior that is often hard to predict. For example, if
for two automorphism x, y ∈ Aut(F ) holds |xy| > |x|, it does not automatically imply that
for every z ∈ Aut(F ) |zxy| > |zx|. Symmetrically, if |xy| < |x|, it does not automatically
imply that for every z ∈ Aut(F ) |zxy| < |zx|.
It was observed that the enhanced LBA often fails to guess the Alice’s key fragments
−1
−1
−1
with conjugates like a−1
j ai aj even if |aj | < |aj ai | < |aj ai aj |. It happens because when

the rank R of the free group F becomes significantly larger than the number of Nielsen
automorphisms in each element of ā, there is a chance that when you multiply a−1
j ai by aj
there will be a lot of reductions going on and final increase in the automorphism’s length
will be minimal. And when the increase in length is small, it increases the probability of
length actually decreasing when it happens inside the Alice’s secret key A. We discuss such
unpredictable behaviour further in the Chapter 14.
Because of that, it makes a sense to add elements of the form a−1
j ai aj to the extended
−1
guessing set Ext even if |a−1
j ai aj | = |aj ai | + C where C ∈ N is a small positive number. By

increasing the parameter C we include more elements in the Ext set, thus making it more
powerful. The algorithm for the set extending turns into
Algorithm Create an extended set with extra elements
1. Initialize a set Ext = ā.
2. Choose a set extension parameter C ∈ N, C ≥ 0.
ε

ε

3. For all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N1 , and all εi , εj = ±1 for which |aεi i aj j | ≤ |ai | + C add aεi i aj j to
the set Ext.
εi
i
4. For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N1 , i 6= j and all εi = ±1 for which |aεi i aj a−ε
i | ≤ |ai aj | + C add
i
aεi i aj a−ε
to the set Ext.
i

It is natural that the introduction of C > 0 increases the computational load on the
computer. It happens in two ways. C increases the size of the Ext set. On one hand, the
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Rank 10

Rank 15

Rank 20

95%
100%
95%
100%

80%
85%
100%
100%

50%
85%
95%
95%

Table 7.5: Success rate of enhanced LBA on the further extended (C = 3) guessing set
larger is Ext the more conjunctions and reductions should be made every time we deal with
Ext. On the other hand, the larger is Ext the more length-decreasing choices the enhanced
LBA has and the higher is the chance of making a wrong choice. Wrong choices lead to
backtracking and increase the number of steps.
We use this new set-extension algorithm for the the enhanced LBA on partial b̄0 set. For
our experiments we have chosen the parameter C = 3. We used this parameter to rerun the
experiments from Table 7.3. The results are presented in Table 7.5.
On average Table 7.5 shows the significant increase in attack’s efficiency. However, for
rank 20 and length 7 the percentage of success actually decreased. It happens because,
as we have already discussed above, the introduction of C > 0 increases the computation
complexity of the attack. Two experiments (one for rank 20, length 7 and the other one
for rank 15 length 5) failed to complete in 30 hours for C = 3 even though they completed
successfully for C = 0. We consider such experiments failures.

7.6

LBA with look-ahead

Here we introduce a modification of the enhanced LBA attack for a better performance on
the most LBA-resistant parameters (that is large group rank and short elements of a and b).
While LBA with backtracking shows good results, its efficiency noticeably drops for
shorter elements of ā. After inspecting a number of cases where the enhanced LBA had
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failed, it was noted that the main reason of failures is extensive backtracking. Indeed, each
LBA step is computationally intensive. To make things worse, in most cases it is possible
to make a few more length-reducing steps ahead after the wrong step, so there is a lot of
backtracking involved. The majority of the failed experiments fail not because of the inability
of the enhanced LBA to find the next step, not because of peaks, but because the experiment
fails to complete in a given time (30 hours in our case). One might speculate that having
more computational powers it is possible to successfully complete those experiments but we
suggest another approach.
In addition to the original heuristic that the correct element reduces the length of the
set b̄0 the most, we add one more heuristic property that after picking the wrong element to
reduce b̄0 it is hard to find the next length-reducing element of ā and even if such element
exists this next-step reduction will be smaller compared to the next-step reduction that
happens after the correct initial step.
We use this new heuristic to modify the enhanced LBA even further. Now we evaluate
each step by the sum of its length reduction and maximum possible next-step length reduction
if this step is taken. Such approach adds weight to the correct steps and decreases the amount
of the backtracking. We apply this new rule only to the steps which use the original elements
of ā. Also, for computing the maximum length of the next-step reduction we use only the
elements of ā. Ignoring the elements that appeared during the set extension helps to greatly
reduce the computational complexity of the algorithm. To modify the enhanced algorithm
we introduce the metric for pairs (c, x) mentioned in enhanced LBA algorithm.
Metric |(c, x)|LA
• if x, x−1 ∈
/ ā then |(c, x)|LA = |cx |
±1

• if x, x−1 ∈ ā then |(c, x)|LA = min|cxy | where y ∈ ā
Now we can state the new version of LBA
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Algorithm LBA with Look-ahead
1. Run Create an extended set with extra elements algorithm to create the set Ext.
2. Initialize a set S = {(b̄0 , 1)}, where 1 is the identity element of Aut(F ).
3. If S = 0 then output FAIL.
4. Choose a pair (c, x) ∈ S with the smallest |(c, x)|LA .


5. For each ξ ∈ Ext and each  = ±1 compute ∆i, = |cx | − |cxξi |.


• If cxξi = b̄ then output the final result (xξi )−1 .
• If ∆i, > 0 then add (c, xξi ) to the set S.
6. Delete (c, x) from the set S.
7. Go to Step 3.
We conducted a series of 100 experiments where the same problems were attacked by
• the enhanced LBA on the extended set with extra elements with the parameter C = 3
and the full set b̄0
• the LBA with look ahead on the extended set with extra elements with the parameter
C = 3 and the full set b̄0
In addition to registering the increased efficiency for the LBA with look-ahead, we observe
one more benefit. When the enhanced LBA and the LBA with look ahead attempted the
same problems, the sets of the successfully attacked problems do not fully match. And it
means that we can use both approaches on the same problems to increase the rate of success
even further. Therefore, in the following Table 7.6 we add the column “joint successes” that
shows the total number of successful experiments when attacking by both methods. In these
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100

of

experi-

enhanced
LBA
30

49
LBA with joint suclook ahead cesses
49
58

Table 7.6: Performance of the LBA with look-ahead compared to the enhanced LBA. The
rank of the free group F is 20, each element of Alice’s and Bob’s set consists of 6 Nielsen
transformations.
LA
5
6
7

enhanced
LBA
3
14
27

LBA with
look ahead
6
21
29

joint successes
9
25
34

Table 7.7: Performance of look-ahead LBA and enhanced LBA for different LA . The rank
of the free group F is 20.
experiments the rank of the free group F is 20, each element of Alice’s and Bob’s set consists
of 6 Nielsen transformations.
Also, we conducted a number of experiments to see how the precision of the LBA with
look-ahead changes when the elements of ā and b̄ become shorter. We conducted 40 experiments where the lengths LA and LB of each element of ā and b̄ is 5, 6 and 7 Nielsen
transformation. In all those experiments, the rank of F is 20, the number of elements in
both ā and b̄ is 10, the number L of elements of ā in A is 40. The number of experiments in
each series is 40.

Chapter 8
Complexity estimation
In this section, we estimate the computational complexity of the LBA attacks. We approach
the estimation from a slightly unusual perspective. Our main focus is on the best-case
complexity. The reason for it is the following: we design our LBA attacks to stay close to
the best-case. As we will show, the worst-case is so bad that there is no hope of solving it
with any reasonably available computational powers.
First, lets analyze the classic LBA with backtracking. The Alice’s secret key A =
aεs11 aεs22 . . . aεsLL consists of L elements. Therefore, the LBA attack should make L successful iterations to find it. Since we want to compute the best-case complexity, we assume that
we do only the successful iterations. Each iteration is finding an element ai ∈ ā that yields
−1
the product ai Ãi−1 b̄0 Ã−1
i−1 ai of the smallest length, where Ãi−1 is the product of the elements

of ā chosen on the previous i − 1 iterations. To find such an element, we must check all pos−1
sible candidates, that is all elements of the set ā. To compute the length of ai Ãi−1 b̄0 Ã−1
i−1 ai

for the single element of ā, we must perform conjugation and reduction of the set Ãi−1 b̄0 Ã−1
i−1
by ai . The set Ãi−1 b̄0 Ã−1
i−1 contains N2 elements, thus we need to perform N2 conjugations
and reductions for every element of ā. There are N1 elements in ā. Thus, the number of
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conjugations ]conj and the number of reductions ]reduct that we need to perform is

]conj = ]reduct = LN1 N2 .

Considering the fact that none of the parameters should be really large, this estimation
does not look bad at all. However, further we will present the actual measurements showing
that conjugations and reductions are very expensive operations. Also, we should consider
the inability of the classic LBA with backtracking to deal with the peaks in Alice’s secret
key A a trade-off for this relatively modest estimation.
Next we evaluate the number of conjugations and reductions needed in the best-case
scenario for the LBA attack on the extended guessing set. There are the following differences
compared to the complexity of the LBA with backtracking. First of all, there is the extended
set itself. It replaces the original set ā when it comes to choosing the conjugation element
for the next iteration. Thus, we replace the size N1 of the set ā by NExt – the size of the
extended guessing set. The natural question is this: how much larger is NExt compared to
N1 ? The answer strongly depends on the parameters been chosen for the AAG protocol.
The longer is the length of the elements of ā and the smaller is the rank R of the free group
F the closer is NExt to the N1 . Subsequently we call such parameters “good” parameters,
opposed to “bad” parameters (short elements of ā and large rank R). For the set ā with 10
elements each consisting of 9 Nielsen transformations and rank R = 10, the set ā was hardly
extending at all so N1 and NExt were equal or almost equal. However, for the set ā with
10 elements each consisting of 6 Nielsen transformations and rank R = 20, NExt was 10–15
times larger than N1 . Obviously, it constitutes 10–15 times growth of the computational
complexity compared to the classical LBA, because we try conjugating by every element in
our guessing set in order to make the next iteration step.
The next factor that changes complexity is the potentially different number of iteration
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steps L. Since the extended set contains elements that are made up of a few different elements
of ā (for example, conjugations), we can iterate towards the result a few elements at a time.
Therefore, the number of steps can be smaller than L. In practice, we observed a small
decrease of the number of iterations of the LBA on the extended set compared to the LBA
with backtracking for some parameters. The problem is the parameters that give the minor
decrease of the number of iterations are the same parameters that give the major growth of
the extended guessing set. That is why it seems reasonable to ignore the potential decrease
of the number of iterations and estimate the number of conjugations ]conj and the number
of reductions ]reduct the following way

]conj = ]reduct = LNExt N2
If we move to the LBA with look-ahead the best-case computational complexity increases
even further. Now for every element of the original set ā that further decreases the length
of b̄0 , we do the additional N1 conjugations and reductions, one conjugation and reduction
for every element of ā. So we can have up to N12 additional computations and reductions on
each iteration. Thus, the best-case estimation of the number of conjugations ]conj and the
number of reductions ]reduct for the LBA with look-ahead is

]conj = ]reduct ≤ L(NExt + N12 )N2
The LBA with look-ahead shows the worst best-case complexity. Given the realistic
parameters, the numbers themselves do not look large for modern computers. The problem
is the operations of conjugation and reduction are really computationally intense. Later
we will evaluate conjugation and reduction further, but now we can point out that their
computational intensity is the reason we use their numbers as a measure of the computational
intensity of LBA algorithms.
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In practice, each iteration of the LBA attack takes a lot of time. All the versions of
LBA presented above have backtracking in them but the practical cost of backtracking is
very high. As if the high cost of each iteration is not bad enough, usually the LBA attack
manages to make a few more steps after making a wrong one. Our experiments showed that
one wrong choice can take the LBA into the maze of dozens or even hundreds of iterations
before it returns on the right track.
This is the reason why we prefer the analysis of the best-case complexity. The idea is
to keep the average-case of the attacks as close to the best-case as possible. This is the
reason the LBA with look-ahead works better than the LBA with the extended set. We
agree to perform a significant amount of additional computations on each step to minimize
backtracking.
Evaluating the total number of all possible iterations on all possible paths (both right
and wrong) is really hard. Of course, it heavily depends on the parameters but also varies
greatly in different cases of the same parameters. Our experiments showed that often the
attack can never (within a given time limit for the experiment of course) go back on the right
track after making a wrong iteration. It means that each side-tree of iterations that diverts
from the correct sequence of iterations can be pretty large. Depending on the parameters,
there can be a lot of such side-trees on each iteration. For some “bad” parameters, it was
not unusual to see a dozen of possible iterations on a single step and the large part of those
iterations was wrong.
In our complexity discussion, we are mainly concerned about the number of conjugations
and reductions that is needed to be done. In addition to the general discussion about their
complexity, we carried out a number of small experiments to get better understanding of
how time consuming conjugations and reductions of automorphisms are in practice. Of
course, the specific numbers depend on the particular computer and implementation of the
algorithms. The computer we used for those experiments has Intel Core i5-6200U 2.30 GHz
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processor and 8 GB of RAM. Both conjugations and reductions was implemented without
multithreading. We performed 1000 experiments (conjunctions and reductions) for each set
of parameters and computed the average time of each. As for the size of the conjugated
and reduced automorphisms, we tried to keep it similar to the sizes that we deal with in
our experiments. Each conjugation approximately corresponds to the conjugation of a single
element of b̄0 by an element of ā, each reduction reduces the result of such conjugation. The
experiment can be described like this
1. Set the number N ils of Nielsen transformations. It corresponds to the number of
Nielsen transformations that make up each element of ā and b̄.
2. Set the rank Rank of the free group F .
3. Repeat 1000 times
• Generate a random automorphism α of rank Rank made of N ils Nielsen transformations. α has the same size as the elements of ā.
• Generate a random automorphism β of rank Rank made of N ils ∗ (2 ∗ 40 + 1)
Nielsen transformations. β has approximately the same size as the elements b̄0
from our experiments. Keep in mind that our experiments use 40 elements of ā
to generate the Alice’s secret key.
• Conjugate β by α and measure the duration of that conjugation.
• Reduce the result of conjugation of β by α and measure the duration of that
reduction.
4. Compute the average duration of the above 1000 conjugations and also average reduction duration.
Below you can see the results.
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N ils
6
7
8
9

Rank 10
143
214
289
384

Rank 15
66
102
145
204

55
Rank 20
35
53
74
106

Table 8.1: Average time to preform conjugation (in milliseconds)
N ils
6
7
8
9

Rank 10
410
668
980
1377

Rank 15
155
253
390
581

Rank 20
72
116
174
262

Table 8.2: Average time to preform reduction (in milliseconds)
Those results give a nice insight in why we measure the complexity of our algorithms
in conjugations and reductions. Those operations turn out to be really computationally
intensive and time consuming sometimes even to an extent of being humanly perceivable.
Also, we can measure the time to generate the Alice’s secret key A. Random generation
of A consisting of L elements of ā requires L − 1 multiplications and 1 reduction. It also
requires the generation of a random sequence of L elements of ā, but it is reasonable to
consider that the choice of L random elements to multiply is negligibly fast compared to
multiplications and reductions. Below is the table with the actual average times it took to
generate the secret Alice’s key for different parameters. For each set of parameters there
were 100 keys generated and the average generation time computed. For those experiments
we used the same computer as for conjugations and reductions (Intel Core i5-6200U 2.30
GHz processor and 8 GB of RAM).
We choose the parameters for the above experiments to generate the keys of the sizes we
used in our experiments. One should not try to directly compare these results with the results
from the tables 8.1 and 8.2 because those tables deal with much larger automorphisms.
The last measurements we want to present here is time it takes to do all the computational
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N ils
6
7
8
9

Rank 10
116
164
225
299

Rank 15
81
106
135
171

56
Rank 20
73
90
109
132

Table 8.3: Average time to generate an Alice’s secret key (in milliseconds)
job to obtain the shared secret key as Alice. This computational job includes
1. Generation of a random set ā. Generation of each of N1 elements of ā requires the
multiplication of LA Nielsen transformations.
2. Generation of the set b̄0 . Generation of each of N2 elements of b̄0 requires 1 conjugation
(2 multiplications) of an element of b̄ by A.
3. Every element of b̄0 must be reduced.
4. Constructing the shared secret key K. It requires multiplication of L elements of ā0
and the Alice’s secret key A.
5. K must be reduced.

In this list we consider automorphisms inversions instantly available as it happens in our
implementation.
The Step 5, reducing K, is a very computationally intensive step. Since the complexity
of reduction is O(|P|7 ) and K is very long, this step takes more time than all other steps of
K generation combined. Because of it, we’ve chosen to measure the time of shared secret
key generation for smaller parameters. We reduced the number L of elements of ā in A (and
correspondingly the number of elements of b̄ in B) to 20.

CHAPTER 8. COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION

N ils
6
7
8
9

Rank 10
295
524
1255
2949

Rank 15
89
178
202
473

57

Rank 20
30
56
99
164

Table 8.4: Average time to generate a shared secret key K (in milliseconds)

Chapter 9
Brute-force security
Here we discuss the possibility of replacing the LBA attacks by a straight-forward “try
all possible keys” brute-force attack. To demonstrate the impropriety of the brute-force
approach we estimate the number of possible keys that such attack should try. As before,
we are given a set ā that contains N1 elements and the number of the elements of ā in the
Alice’s secret key L. If no elements of ā commute the number ]A of all possible keys is

]A = 2N1 (2N1 − 1)L−1
Such number of possible keys greatly discourages the brute-force attack, however the
elements of ā sometimes commute for “bad” parameters. We conducted the following experiment to evaluate the possible number of pairs of commuting elements in ā. We took one of
the worst parameters that we have dealt with in this work (the rank R = 20, the length of
each element of ā equals 6, the number of elements in ā is 10). We generated random sets
ā for those parameters and counted the number of pairs of commuting elements in each set.
For 1000 sets, the average number of commuting pairs in each set was 0.534. In other words,
we have found one commuting pair in every two sets. Thus, our evaluation of the number
of possible Alice’s secret keys A should not change a lot even for “bad” parameters.
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We can conclude that the brute-force attack is inefficient and cannot replace the LBA
attack.
It is important to mention that ]A is so large that even the quadratic speedup offered by
the Grover’s algorithm does not make the brute-force attack viable.

Chapter 10
Important properties of Aut(F )
In this section, we discuss the properties of Aut(F ). Those properties offer us the insight
in the already observed LBA performance and provide us with a better understanding of
Aut(F ) for future research.

10.1

Irregular peaks

The LBA attack that was described above has a high percentage of successful applications
but in some experiments it still fails to find a key. For high ranks and short elements in
Alice’s and Bob’s sets, the success rate of LBA drops below 60%. Those lower results are
caused by the complex nature of the Aut(F ) group.
One major reason for LBA failures is the presence of peaks in Alice’s secret key A. We
teach the LBA to handle peaks by including possible peaks in the extended guessing set Ext.
But some peaks in Alice’s secret key appear without any predictable patterns and therefore
are hard to include in the extended guessing set Ext.
Here is the example of such irregular peak to demonstrate. In this example, neither ξ −1 φξ
nor ξ −1 ψξ contain any peaks. Therefore, these conjugations do not seem to belong in Ext.
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But the product of these conjugations produces a peak |(ξ −1 ψξ) ∗ (ξ −1 φξ)| = |ξ −1 ψφξ| ≤
|ξ −1 ψφ|.
Example 10.1.1. Consider the following automorphisms from Aut(F3 )
Automorphism ψ :



a → ca



b → a−1 b




 c→c
Automorphism φ :



a→a



b → ab




 c → cbb
Automorphism ξ :



a → ab−1 b−1



b→b





c→c
In the next example, the product ψφ does not produce a peak and |ψφ| > |ψ|. But when
ψφ is a fragment of a longer sequence ξψφ a peak occurs and |ξψφ| < |ξψ|. This example
shows that the behaviour of automorphism as a part of a larger automorphism depends not
only on the original automorphism itself but also on the context in which it is included.
Example 10.1.2. Consider the following automorphisms from Aut(F3 )
Automorphism ψ :



a → ab



b → cb




 c→c
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Automorphism φ :



a → ab−1



b→b




 c → cb
Automorphism ξ :



a→a



b→b




 c → caaaa
Finding such irregular peaks in order to include them in Ext is hard because it is not
obvious where to look for them. Also, the amount of such peaks is significant while the
chance of them appearing in A is very low. Thus, even if we try to account for such lowprobability peaks we end up with a very large Ext that slows down the LBA significantly
without any reasonable increase of the LBA success rate.
Because of such complex behavior, we have introduced the guessing set with extra elements in Section 7.5. Also, this is one of the reasons why there is a chance of an LBA failure
even on LBA-weak parameters.

10.2

Alternative normal form for the automorphisms
from Aut(F )

So far, we were dealing with automorphisms presented as a set of images of all letters
from the alphabet X of a free group F . This presentation of the automorphisms (which
we will subsequently call ILP that stands for Images of the Letters Presentation) provides
us with an efficiently computable normal form. However, that is not the only available
presentation. Another, and rather obvious, way to present automorphisms is a sequence
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of Nielsen transformations. Since every automorphism from Aut(F ) can be presented as a
sequence of Nielsen transformations, this presentation is quite possible.
We did not use this presentation before because of the problems with the normal form in
it. Often times, the same automorphism can be presented by a few very different sequences
so having an efficiently computable normal form is crucial. The example of such different
presentations can be two sequences:
Sequence 1: (a → ab) ∗ (b → a−1 b) ∗ (a → ba) ∗ (a → a−1 )
Sequence 2: a → b
The sequences 1 and 2 both define the same automorphism but it is not immediately
obvious from the the presentations themselves.
The normal form for the Nielsen transformations presentation (subsequently called NTP)
can be obtained from the previous ILP presentation of automorphisms. Indeed, since the
images of X can be used as a normal form of an automorphism, we can define an unambiguous
rules of converting this normal form to the NTP. For our experiments we choose the following
algorithm:
Algorithm Converting the automorphism φ from ILP to NTP
1. Set Seq to be an initially empty sequence of Nielsen transformations.
2. If the length of φ is equal to the rank r of the free group F go to Step 4.
3. From all Nielsen transformations choose transformation n that minimizes |φn|ILP .
• If |φ|ILP − |φn|ILP > 0, set φ = φn and add n to the beginning of Seq. Go to
Step 2.

CHAPTER 10. IMPORTANT PROPERTIES OF AU T (F )

64

• If |φ|ILP − |φn|ILP = 0, find the automorphism ψ of the same length as φ such
that
n1 ...ni φ = ψ and the length of ψ can be reduced by multiplication by one of
Nielsen transformations. n1 ...ni is the set of Nielsen transformations of types 3, 4
and 5. Add these transformations to the beginning of Seq. φ = ψ. Go to Step 2.
4. Multiply φ by Nielsen transformations of type 1 to get rid of all inverse letters in
alphabet letter’s images. Add each such transformation to the beginning of Seq.
5. Multiply φ by Nielsen transformations of type 2 to bring φ to identity. Add each such
transformation to the beginning of Seq.
6. Replace every transformation in Seq by it’s inverse. The resulting sequence in Seq is
the NTP form of the initial φ
In step 3 of this algorithm, we try to reduce the length as fast as we can but sometimes we
can run into the situation when no single Nielsen transformation can reduce the length of the
automorphism. In this case, we know that there is an automorphism that can be obtained
from the current automorphism without changing the length and the second automorphism
can be reduced further by one of the Nielsen transformations. This fact follows from the
Nielsen reduction procedure.
The important thing to mention about the above algorithm of ILP to NTP conversion is
its complexity. This algorithm is computationally heavy. Most of the work should be done
on Step 3 when we do multiplication and reduction for every Nielsen transformation of type
3,4 and 5.
Thus, if we have an automorphism in NTP and we want to obtain its NTP normal form,
we must perform two steps. First, we must convert NTP to ILP. Second, we must convert
ILP back to NTP following the unambiguous rules of the conversion algorithm defined above.
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The first step is fast. However, the second step is slow, and as of now there is no known way
to convert ILP to NTP efficiently. During the LBA attack, we can afford to compute such
normal form a few times but doing it all the time for realistically complex automorphisms
is not practical.
The computationally expensive normal form of NTP and two more NTP properties that
we will discuss next lead us to believe that NTP is not good for use in the LBA attacks. So
what are these two NTP properties?
The first property is the small size of an automorphism in the NTP form. The sizes
of the images of the letters of X grow exponentially with the linear growth of the number
of Nielsen transformations that make up the automorphism. We use SLP to store and
process these images because SLP promises the computationally- and memory-efficient way
to deal with them. We said before that we expect SLPs to compare in efficiency to NTP
presentation. However, in practice, because of the cancellations of the inverse letters in
words, SLP presentation of X images is memory consuming and all operations on it are
computationally intense. Therefore, if Alice and Bob use large automorphisms in NTP form
they must convert them to the expensive normal form just a few times (for shared secret key
and sets ā0 and b̄0 ), while attacker got to do it many times. This computational imbalance
allows to make LBA practically infeasible.
One might justly argue that LBA does not require computing normal forms often. Indeed,
most of the time LBA cares only for the length of the automorphisms. We really need to
compare the equality of the automorphisms only to check if we have reached the end of the
attack. And it does not look so bad for the attacker. However, there is the second property
that does not allow to use NTP form for the LBA easily.
The second property of NTP is instability and unpredictability of an above-discusses
normal form. Here is what we mean by “unstable and unpredictable”: If we have two
automorphisms φ, ψ ∈ Aut(F ), the normal form of the product φ∗ψ can bare no resemblance
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to neither φ and ψ nor their normal forms. This property has two immediate consequences.
First, it becomes unclear how we can deal with automorphisms in NTP during the LBA
attack without constantly converting to ILP and potentially back to NTP. Second, this
inconvenient property of NTP normal forms translates to the length measurement.
The most natural way to define the length of the automorphism in NTP is by the number
of Nielsen transformations that make up its NTP form. However, for the two fully reduced
automorphisms φ = n1 ∗ ... ∗ ni−1 ∗ ni and ψ = n1 ∗ ... ∗ ni−1 where all n are Nielson
transformations, the lengths of their normal forms can differ significantly in any manner.
For example, the length of the normal form of ψ can be significantly larger than the length
of the normal form of φ though one might expect the opposite behaviour.
To illustrate the unpredictable behaviour of the NTP, we conducted the following experiment. We generate the automorphism φ39 as a sequence of 39 Nielsen transformations of type
3 and 4 (length changing Nielsen transformations). Then we generate the automorphism φ40
by applying one more random Nielsen transformation of types 3 or 4 to φ39 that does not
cancel out with the existing transformations. Thus, the lengths of φ39 and φ40 differ by 1.
Then we compute normal NTP forms for both φ39 and φ40 . Here is the table showing the
difference in lengths |normN T P (φ40 )| − |normN T P (φ39 )|. The total number of experiments is
100. The rank R of the base free group F is 10. The length is understood as a number of
Nielsen transformations of types 3, 4 and 5 only.
As mentioned above, we expect the difference of lengths of the normal forms to be 1.
Instead of it, the difference varies greatly and goes as high as 11. In 11% of the experiments we
observe the decrease in length of the nornal form when going from 39 Nielsen transformations
to 40. The counterintuitive results in 11 out of 100 experiments should be explained by the
properties of the NTP normal form. In 8% of experiments, we observe no change of length
and it is also unacceptable from the LBA point of view.
To demonstrate the properties of the NTP presentation further we define the specter of
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Figure 10.1: NTP length differences
NTP presentation of the automorphism.
Definition 10.2.1. The specter of the NTP presentation of the automorphism φ ∈ Aut(F )
is the number of occurrences of each Nielsen transformation in this NTP presentation.
For the above definition, the number of occurrences of a Nielsen transformation and the
number of occurrences of its inverse are counted separately. We used specter to further evaluate the difference of normN T P (φ40 ) and normN T P (φ39 ). It is intuitive that different specters
mean differently looking automorphisms that are hard to compare without converting them
to ILP.
We repeated the experiments for normN T P (φ40 ) and normN T P (φ39 ), but this time instead
of comparing the length of normN T P (φ40 ) and the length normN T P (φ39 ) we compare their
specters. We compute the ratio

similarity = common/total

where total is the total number of Nielsen transformations in normN T P (φ39 ) (in other words,
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total is the NTP-length of normN T P (φ39 )) and common is the number of Nielsen transformations that occur in both normN T P (φ40 ) and normN T P (φ39 ). For example, if normN T P (φ39 )
has three occurrences of a → ab and normN T P (φ40 ) has only two, then normN T P (φ40 ) and
normN T P (φ39 ) have two occurrences of a → ab in common.
Again, we conducted 100 experiments and for each experiment we computed the
similarity value. The average value of similarity for 100 experiments was 0,456. Such
a low level of similarity for the normal forms of the automorphisms that originally differed
only by one Nielsen transformation is another demonstration of the unpredictable nature of
the NTP normal forms of automorphisms.
All of the above lead us to believe that NTP form is unfitting for the LBA attacks.
However, some other uses may be possible. For example, Alice and Bob can use the fact
that NTP form is much shorter than ILP form in practice. It allows to share public data in
a condensed form when the data channel bandwidth is limited. Also, NTP form allows an
easy inversion of the automorphism, whereas there is no known efficient way to invert the
automorphism in ILP form.

Chapter 11
LBA-resistant key generation
In this section, we discuss a way to improve the resistance of AAG to the LBA attacks by
generating special non-random Alice’s secret key A.
The idea comes from the observation of the major weakness of LBA. LBA attacks do not
like peaks in the Alice’s secret key and subsequently in the elements of b̄0 . In the enhanced
and look-ahead LBA attacks, we extend the initial Alice’s public set to fight those peaks.
Still, the suggested set extension fights only the peaks of the following types:
• ...ai ai+1 ... where a part of ai+1 cancels out with a part of ai .
• ...ai ...ai+2 ... where a part of ai+2 cancels out with a part of ai .
The extension allows the enhanced and look-ahead LBAs to efficiently attack randomly
generated Alice’s secret key A. But what happens if A contains a peak of a different type?
The LBA attack fails.
The above mentioned types of peaks are responsible for the majority of peaks appearing
in a randomly generated A and the chance of getting random peak of other type is very
low. It means that we should move away from completely random key generation in order
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to reliably introduce such improbable peaks. Also, we introduce some rules for the Alice’s
public set ā, thus moving away from a completely random ā as well.
The rules presented below show just one of the possible approaches to building LBAresistant keys. We do not claim that they are optimal. Even more so, to present the idea
we want to build a pretty simple example.
We split the Alice’s public set ā in three parts:
• General purpose elements. They are just random automorphisms.
• “Peak” elements – the elements that are used to create peaks.
• “Fill” elements – used to fill the space between “peak” elements without spoiling their
ability to create peaks. Obviously, some restrictions should apply to both “peak” and
“fill” elements.
Now, laying down really efficient rules for creating “peak” and “fill” elements can be
quite a creative task in itself. To demonstrate how the whole construction can work, let us
build a very simple example without claiming that it is optimal. Each element of ā in the
algorithm below initially has LA Nielsen transformations in it.
Algorithm Generating the initial “peak” automorphism p of length LA
1. a = xR/2+1 → xR/2+1 xi or a = xR/2+1 → xi xR/2+1 where R is the rank of the free group
F and i > R/2 + 1
±
2. Multiply a by LA − 1 Nielsen transformations of from xk → xk x±
l or xk → xl xk where

k, l < R/2 + 1.
3. Reduce p = Reduce(a).
Algorithm Generating the “fill” automorphism f of length LA
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1. a = xi → xR/2+1 xi or a = xi → xi xR/2+1 where R is the rank of the free group F and
i > R/2 + 1
±
2. Multiply a by LA − 1 Nielsen transformations of from xk → xk x±
l or xk → xl xk where

k, l ≥ R/2 + 1.
3. f = Reduce(a).
It is an important property of “peak” and “fill” elements that they do not fully commute
with each other. Using the above algorithms we can generate an Alice’s public set
Algorithm Creating the initial set ā for LBA-resistant keys
1. Choose a number Ngp of general purpose elements. Generate Ngp of the length LA and
place them in ā.
2. Choose a number Npeak of “peak” elements. Following the “peak” automorphism
generation algorithm, generate Npeak “peak” automorphisms pi and place them in ā.
3. Choose a number Nf ill of “fill” elements. Following the “fill” automorphism generation
algorithm, generate Nf ill “fill” automorphisms fi and place them in ā.
From the elements of the LBA-resistant set ā, we can generate an LBA-resistant Alice’s
private key A using the following algorithm:
Algorithm Generating an LBA-resistant key A of SL elements of ā
1. Choose the numbers head, construct, mid, end > 1 such that head + construct + mid +
construct + end = SL
2. A = ash1 · ... · ashhead , where ash are the elements of ā or its inverses and no neighbouring
elements cancel each other out.
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3. A = A · psp1 · ... · pspconstruct , where psp1 · ... · psconstruct is a random sequence of “peak”
elements and their inverses, where no neighbouring elements are the same or inverses
of each other (including ashhead ).
4. A = A · fsf1 · ... · fsfmid , where fsf1 · ... · fsfmid is a random sequence of “fill” elements and
their inverses, where no neighbouring elements are the same or inverses of each other.
−1
−1
−1
5. A = A · p−1
scconstruct · ... · psc1 , where pscconstruct · ... · psc1 is a inverted sequence of “peak”

elements and their inverses from Step 3. After multiplication by each p−1
sc , perform
reduction. If after the reduction the length of A has increased, increase the psc by a
±
random Nielsen transformation of from xk → xk x±
l or xk → xl xk where k, l < R/2 + 1,

discards the current A and go back to step 2.
6. A = A · ase1 · ... · aseend , where ase1 · ... · aseend is a product of a random sequence of
elements of ā and their inverses, where no neighbouring elements cancel each other
(including p−1
sc1 ) out.
7. Reduce A
The idea of the above algorithm is this: each inverse of “peak” element added on Step 5
largely cancels out with the corresponding “peak” element added on Step 3. Adding “fill”
elements on Step 4 ensures that the “peak” elements do not cancel each other out completely.
Thus, we expect each “peak” element added on Step 5 to reduce the length after reduction.
It creates a peak of height construct meaning that for construct multiplications in a row the
length of A decreases after reduction.
We conducted the series of experiments trying to break LBA-resistant Alice’s secret keys
with both enhanced LBA and LBA with look-ahead. We use the rank of a free group R = 10
because this lower rank is favorable to LBA. Other parameters: the number of elements of ā
in A is 20 (8 random elements of ā, 5 “stumble” elements then 2 “fill” elements and finally 5
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Enchanced LBA
LBA with look-ahead

9
0/20
0/20

8
0/20
0/20
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7
0/20
0/20

6
0/20
0/20

Table 11.1: Success rate of enhanced LBA and LBA with look-ahead for different LA for a
securely generated key A
more “stumble” elements that are the inverses of the first 5). Table 11.1 shows the results of
the experiments. Each cell represents the number of successful attacks out of 20 experiments
for that set of parameters. One can see that none of the LBA-resistant keys was broken by
any version of LBA.
The natural question is, can we further extend the Alice’s public set ā to account for the
new type of peaks. The answer is yes, we can. But lets evaluate how large such extension
can be.
The constructions that generates the peak in A looks like this

−1
peak = at1 · ... · atconstruct · af1 ... · afmid · a−1
tconstruct · ... · at1

where at are “peak” elements and af are “fill” elements. To avoid including in the extended
set all such constructions for all possible values of construct and mid, we can extend ā with
a smaller number of all possible elements of the form

−1
aext = at1 · ... · atconstruct · af · a−1
tconstruct · ... · at1

Indeed, if we multiply peak construction by the corresponding aext the peak construction
looses one “fill” element.
If the number of possible “peak” elements is Npeak and the number of possible “fill”
elements is Nf ill then the total number Naext of all possible aext is

Naext > construct2Npeak −1 · 2Nf ill
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The above estimation shows that the number Naext grows fast, and even small values of
construct, Npeak and Nf ill extend the set ā so much that LBA attack becomes computationally too difficult.
On the other hand, generating the LBA-resistant key A is not much more difficult than
generating a completely random A. Compared to generating a random A, the LBA-resistant
A can require some additional automorphism multiplications and reductions if in Generating
the LBA-resistant key algorithm there is jumping from the step 5 to the step 2. In practice,
we did not observe any significant delay in Alice’s key generation when we switched from
random keys to LBA-resistant keys.

Chapter 12
Conclusion
We have analyzed the security properties of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol used with
the base group of automorphisms of a free group. We found that the AAG protocol used
with Aut(F ) is susceptible to different versions of the length-based attack. We showed the
efficient way to use the existing versions of the LBA attack and also introduced our own new
version of LBA which we call the LBA with look-ahead. The LBA with look-ahead provides
us with a significantly increased success rate for the most attack-resistant combinations of
parameters. All the proposed versions of LBA can be used for other cryptography protocols
based on different versions of the conjugacy search problem (notably the Ko-Lee protocol)
used with Aut(F ).
However, our experiments and theoretical evaluations showed that there are the parameters that present additional challenges for the LBA attacks. These parameters are a high
rank R of the free group F and a low number of Nielsen transformations in the elements
that make up ā and b̄, the public sets of Alice and Bob. We showed that the success rate
of the LBA attacks drops for such parameters. Therefore, these parameters can be used to
develop a secure way to use the AAG protocol with Aut(F ).
We experimented with a presentation of automorphisms in a form of the sequence of
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Nielsen transformations and suggested to use it as a compact way to exchange automorphisms
between Alice and Bob. This presentation that we called NTP allows easy inversion of the
automorphism. It is especially useful since ILP presentation does not have an efficient
algorithm for automorphism inversion.
We suggested to move away from the random key generation and use the known limitations of the LBA attacks to create private keys that are resistant to such attacks. We
suggested one such method that generated secret keys, none of which was broken by any
LBA attack in our experiments.
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